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Equality of opportunity is a theory in which personal responsibility plays a central part in
determining whether a social system is just. Individuals are held responsible for some
characteristics, called efforts, and not responsible for other characteristics, called
circumstances. Marc Fleurbaey and Walter Bossert point out that this results in two principles:
On the one hand, differences in outcomes that are due to differences in circumstances are
objectionable. On the other hand, effort should be adequately rewarded. The former is called
the compensation principle, the latter the reward principle.
The three dominant theories about what people are responsible for are responsibility for
choice, responsibility for preferences, and responsibility for control. This entry explains these
theories, what they mean in terms of equality of opportunity, and how they propose to
measure inequality of opportunity. It discusses recent empirical applications and how they link
with theories of responsibility. Finally, further issues associated with theories of equality of
opportunity are pointed out.
Theories of Responsibility
A first theory, responsibility for choice, maintains that individuals are responsible for the
choices they make from the options they can choose from. This is often referred to as an ex-
ante principle, as it evaluates individuals’ options, the situation before they make their choice.
A second theory is responsibility for preferences. It says that, in the evaluation of each
individual’s well-being, the trade-offs between different goods, for instance between health
and income, must be based on the individual’s own relative valuation of these goods. This is
an ex-post principle, as the purpose is to evaluate the actual situation of each individual once
he has chosen. A third theory, responsibility for control, holds individuals responsible for what
they control, such as the number of cigarettes they smoke or the number of hours they work.
This principle is also ex-post.
Circumstances are then defined as characteristics that are not efforts. Gender, ethnic origin,
and parental background frequently figure as prominent circumstances. Evidently, for each of
the theories, what they take as effort can be partly determined by circumstances. What
individuals choose from a given set, their trade-offs between different goods and the number
of cigarettes they smoke, are at least partly determined by their circumstances. This need not
be a problem for responsibility for choice or preferences—it makes sense to hold individuals
responsible for their choices or preferences even if these are determined by their
circumstances—but, as stressed by John Roemer, it is problematic for the control view. As
individuals have no control over their circumstances, they cannot be responsible for the effect
of these circumstances on their efforts, such that normatively relevant efforts have to be
independent from circumstances.
John Roemer proposes to hold an individual responsible not for his effort as such but for the
relative rank of his effort within the distribution of effort of all those that face exactly the same
circumstances as he does. Suppose we have 100 descendants from blue-collar and 50 from
white-collar parents and that this is the only circumstance we consider. In that case, the
proposal is that the blue-collar descendant that smokes the 50th-highest number of cigarettes
of all blue-collar descendants and the white-collar descendant that smokes the 25th-highest
number of cigarettes of all the white-collar descendants have the same normatively relevant
effort as far as smoking behavior is concerned.
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Equality of Opportunity
With a responsibility-for-choice theory, the focus of attention becomes the set of options
individuals can choose from. Equality of opportunity prevails only if all individuals can choose
from the same set. Individuals might make different choices from this set, such that they end
up with different outcomes, but, as they are responsible for their choice, the resulting
differences in outcomes are to be accepted.
With a responsibility-for-preference theory, the focus of attention becomes the quantities of
goods individuals have. Marc Fleurbaey and François Maniquet argue that respect for the
different trade-offs individuals make between goods is obtained when, for all individuals, their
actual combination of goods is exactly as good as another particular combination of goods.
For example, in a world with only two goods, health and income, equality of opportunity
based on responsibility for preferences is obtained if all individuals find their actual
combination of health and income exactly as good as a reference level of health (e.g., perfect
health) and a level of income that is the same for everyone. When individuals make different
trade-offs between both goods, equality of opportunity can occur even though they have
different actual combinations of health and income.
A responsibility-for-control theory can be applied to almost any outcome. Roemer argues it is
applicable to individuals’ well-being, measured, for instance, by their income, as well as with a
partial or more pragmatic view, where the focus is, for instance, on access to education or
health or obtained level of education or health. Here equality of opportunity prevails if all
those that exercise the same normatively relevant efforts have the same outcome, irrespective
of their circumstances. As a result of differences in efforts, again equality of opportunity and
inequality of outcome can occur simultaneously.
Measuring Inequality of Opportunity
To assess the amount of inequality of opportunity with responsibility for choice requires us to
collect, for each individual, data of all the options he can choose from. This exercise is
plagued with difficulties. First, one can typically observe only the options actually chosen by
someone. Second, comparison of unequal sets is difficult. Suppose Ann can choose between
“a blue Ferrari” and “going to Rio de Janeiro,” while Bob can choose between “a red Ferrari”
and “a blue Ferrari.” Both have two options. Yet one could argue that Bob’s options are very
similar and so do not offer a lot of choice. This argument loses force if both Ann and Bob
agree that the only thing that makes life worthwhile is possession of a “red Ferrari.”
Responsibility for preferences requires us to collect, for each individual, data on his
preferences. Fleurbaey and Maniquet advocated the following way to measure the value of
the actual combination of goods an individual has and that respects his preferences. Fix, for
all goods except one, a reference value (such as perfect health). Determine his equivalent
quantity of the remaining good (income), which is such that the reference value of health and
this quantity of the remaining good is exactly as good as his actual combination of goods
(health and income). This equivalent quantity is then a measure of the individual’s well-being,
and inequality of opportunity is measured by the inequality in the distribution of equivalent
quantities. Few surveys systematically ask respondents for their preferences between
different goods. Moreover, obtaining reliable information on an individual’s preferences is
difficult. These are the main reasons applications of this method are rare, but Koen Decancq
and Erik Schokkaert have recently applied the method successfully.
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Responsibility for control can be applied to any outcome and requires information on this
outcome and individuals’ efforts, as the goal is to measure inequality between people that
have the same efforts. Often surveys lack information on efforts. Remember Roemer’s
proposal that an individual’s normatively relevant effort is determined by his relative rank
within the effort distribution of those that face exactly the same circumstances. Suppose, in
addition, that the outcome is a strictly increasing function of effort. His normatively relevant
effort can then be identified, without observing efforts, by his relative rank within the
distribution of outcomes of those that face exactly the same circumstances as he. After having
identified individuals’ normatively relevant effort this way, one can calculate the outcome
inequality between those that have the same normatively relevant effort and aggregate these
inequalities.
Empirical Applications
Since the work by François Bourguignon and his coauthors, there has been an explosion of
empirical work that measures inequality of opportunity. The most frequently used empirical
method is based on the ex-ante principle of responsibility for choice. The basic assumption is
that the options an individual can choose from are determined by his circumstances, and all
individuals that have the same circumstances can choose from the same options. Next, either
one assigns a well-being value to each option, for instance the income it generates, or one
borrows from the pragmatic approach advocated by Roemer in the context of responsibility for
control and focuses on the quantity of a particular good in each option. The average well-
being or the average quantity of the good obtained by those that share the same
circumstances is taken as a measure of the value of their opportunity set. The inequality in the
distribution constructed by assigning to every individual this value of his opportunity set is
then a measure of ex-ante inequality of opportunity. Observe that the average well-being or
quantity of the good is computed after individuals have made their choice such that it takes
into account the effect of circumstances on choices. As a result, this effect influences the
inequality between the averages in the constructed distribution and thus measured inequality.
Hence, in this approach, individuals are not held responsible for the extent to which their
choices are determined by their circumstances.
To apply this method, one has to select circumstances. Selected circumstances typically
include parental background (education or occupation), gender, ethnicity, and region of birth.
This choice is usually motivated by saying that these characteristics are beyond the control of
the individual, although it would be more consistent with the ex-ante view to say they are not
chosen by the individual.
Paolo Brunori, Francisco Ferreira, and Vito Peragine compare estimates of inequality of
opportunity for income based on the method outl ined here for different countries.
Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark, and Sweden) have the highest equality of
opportunity, followed by continental European countries. Next come the Anglo-Saxon
countries (Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and the highest inequality of
opportunity is found in Turkey, India, Latin American countries, and South Africa.
Further Issues
Apart from the decision about what to hold individuals responsible for, there are several other
issues when thinking about equality of opportunity and responsibility. A first issue is at which
point in their lives we start to hold people responsible. Is there something like a canonical
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moment, such that individuals are not responsible for anything before that moment and are
fully responsible after it, or is responsibility something that gradually develops? The latter is
probably more reasonable, but accounting for it is fraught with problems, as individuals
develop at different rates, which can be hard to determine.
A second issue is that equality of opportunity can conflict with other values and that
respecting the efforts of one generation leads to unequal opportunities for the next. The
autonomy of the family, which requires that one should abstain from coercively interfering with
the consensual relations within the family, is generally acknowledged. Moreover, from the
theories about responsibility, it follows that one should respect parental choices, preferences,
or actions taken to help their children. Some parents, however, have more means to do so
than others. An opportunity-egalitarian perspective implies we should not accept the
inequalities that arise for the next generation from the autonomous functioning of the family or
from the help parents give to their children.
A third issue is whether equality of opportunity is all that society should be concerned about.
Equality of opportunity and individuals ending up with very bad outcomes can coexist. Some
people make bad choices, willingly take risks, and see their lives threatened or end up in
poverty. Can one really justify not helping them with the argument that they are responsible
for their choices or for putting their lives in danger? Several authors propose versions of
equality-of-opportunity theories that soften the sometimes harsh conclusions it can lead to.
Finally, responsibility for control requires that individuals have control over some behaviors
and thus assumes the existence of free will, which is something not accepted by some
neuroscientists.
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